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ABSTRACT 
  Previously published research by two of the authors found that returns on 
R&D for drugs introduced into the market in the 1970s and 1980s were highly 
skewed and that the top decile of new drugs accounted for close to half the 
overall market value. In the 1990s, there have been significant changes to the 
R&D environment for new medicines: the rapid growth of managed care 
organizations; indications that R&D costs are rising at a rate faster than overall 
inflation; new market strategies of major pharma firms; increased alliances with 
the emerging biotech sector; and, the increased attention focused on the 
pharmaceutical industry in the political arena. Nevertheless, analysis of new 
drugs entering the market from 1990-1994 resulted in findings similar to the 
earlier research—pharmaceutical R&D is characterized by a highly skewed 
distribution of returns and a mean industry internal rate of return modestly in 
excess of the cost-of-capital. These findings provide support for a model of 
intensive R&D competition by pharmaceutical firms to gain economic advantage 
through product innovation and differentiation.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  Competition in the research based pharmaceutical industry centers 
around the introduction of new drug therapies.  In this paper, we examine the 
returns on R&D for new drug entities introduced into the U.S. market in the first 
half of the 1990s.  This research work builds directly on earlier analyses of      2
returns on R&D for the 1970s and 1980s introductions performed by Grabowski 
and Vernon
[1, 2]. 
  Our prior analyses indicate that this industry has exhibited very skewed 
distributions of returns.  In this regard, several significant new classes of drug 
therapies have been introduced since the late 1970s.  Early movers in these 
classes have obtained the highest returns on R&D.  We found that the top decile 
of new drugs accounted for close to half of the overall market value associated 
with all the new drug introductions in our 1970s and 1980s samples. 
  The results of our prior analysis are also consistent with an economic 
model of rivalrous R&D competition.  In particular, the promise of above average 
expected returns produces rapid increases in industry R&D expenditures, as 
firms compete to exploit these opportunities, until returns become unattractive.  
From an industry perspective, our results indicate that mean returns on R&D are 
relatively close in value to the risk adjusted cost-of-capital for drug industry 
investments.  This rent-seeking model is also supported by a recent empirical 
analysis by Scherer, who finds a strong relationship between industry R&D 
outlays and profits over the period of 1962 to 1996
[3]. 
An investigation into the drug returns in the 1990s is timely on a number of 
grounds. First, this decade has been characterized by the rapid growth of 
managed care organizations on the demand side of the market for 
pharmaceuticals
[4].  This has led to greater access to and utilization of 
pharmaceuticals, but also greater generic competition in the post-patent period.  
Second, a new study of R&D costs by DiMasi, et al. indicates that the R&D costs 
for new drugs have continued to rise much faster than the rate of general 
inflation.
[5]   This reflects, among other factors, the increased size of clinical trials 
compared to those for earlier new drug introductions.  Third, many firms are 
changing their market strategies and attempting to launch their products 
simultaneously across world markets, reflecting the higher R&D investment costs 
and more intensive competition from new molecules in the same product class.      3
In addition to these economic developments, the industry continues to be 
the subject of considerable attention by policy makers.  Recent policy initiatives 
include a Medicare prescription drug benefit, the parallel importation of drugs 
from Canada and Mexico, and various state programs affecting drug costs and 
utilization of the poor and elderly populations.  The potential effects of these 
policy initiatives on R&D returns remain an important issue for research.  Our 
past work on R&D returns has provided a framework for the Congressional 
Budget Office and other groups to consider the effects on R&D of the proposed 
Clinton Health Care Reform Act and the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984
[6, 7]. 
The plan of the paper is the following.  In the next section, we describe the 
data samples and methodology for our analysis of the returns to 1990-94 new 
molecular entities (NMEs).  Section III presents the empirical findings on the 
distribution of returns and a sensitivity analysis involving the main economic 
parameters.  Section IV provides a discussion of the results and comparisons 
with the historical findings from our prior work which is based on the same 
methodology.  The final section provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
      4




This section explains the methodology and key data inputs used in 
estimating the returns to 1990-94 new chemical entities (NCEs)..
(1)    A detailed 
discussion of the general methodology is provided in our earlier papers on R&D 
return
[1, 2].  Our focus here is on the similarities and differences of the 1990s 
sample from our analysis of prior NCE cohorts. 
  The basic sample is 118 NCEs introduced into the United States between 
1990 and 1994.  This is a comprehensive sample of the NCEs originating from 
and developed by the pharmaceutical industry that were introduced into the 
United States in the 1990-94 time period.
(2)    The number of NCE introductions 
has increased significantly in the early 1990s compared to the 1980s.  The 
corresponding 1980-84 NCE sample was 64 NCEs.  This increase in NCEs 
reflects the increased R&D expenditures for new entities by the traditional 
pharmaceutical industry as well as the growth of the independent 
biopharmaceutical industry.
[8]  The latter industry was in its infancy in the early 
1980s, but by the early 1990s it had become a significant source of new drug 
introductions.
(3) 
  Our basic procedure is as follows:  for each new drug in our sample, 
worldwide sales profiles are constructed over the drug's complete product life 
cycle.  These sales values are converted to after-tax profits and cash flow values 
using industry data on profit margins and other economic parameters.  These 
data are combined with R&D investment information, based on the recent 
analysis by DiMasi et al.
[5] Mean NPVs and IRRs are then computed for this 
portfolio of new drug introductions.  The distribution of returns is another major 
focus of our analysis. 
      5
B. Cost-of-Capital 
 
In our earlier analysis of 1980 NCEs, we utilized a 10.5% real cost-of-
capital for the pharmaceutical firms.  This was based on an analysis of the 
industry using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that was performed by 
Myers and Shyum-Sunder.
[9] Their study was commissioned by the Office of 
Technology Assessment as part of a larger study on R&D costs, risk and 
rewards.
[10] They found that the real after-tax cost-of-capital on equity plus debt 
varied between 10% and 11% during the 1980s. 
For our sample of 1990-94 introductions, the relevant investment period 
spans the mid-1980s through the late 1990s.  In their original article, Myers and 
Shyum-Sunder provided estimates of the cost-of-capital for 1985 and 1990. 
Myers and Howe have subsequently provided a related analysis for 1994.
[11]   We 
also performed a comparable CAPM for analysis for January 2000.  The results 
of these CAPM based studies are summarized in DiMasi et al.
[5] 
Using these four CAPM based analyses, occurring at roughly five year 
intervals, we found that the mean cost-of-capital for pharmaceuticals over this 
period was just over 11%.  Consequently, 11% was selected as the baseline 
value for the cost-of-capital in this analysis of 1990 NCEs.  This represents a 
small increase from the 10.5% cost-of-capital utilized for the 1980 NCEs.  
As Myers and Shyum-Sunder indicated in their original article, the CAPM 
approach provides somewhat conservative cost-of-capital values with respect to 
investment in new prescription drugs.  One reason is the equity market data on 
which the CAPM analysis is based pertains to all the different functional areas 
and commercial activities of drug firms (which can include over the counter 
drugs, animal health, basic chemicals, etc.).  Another reason that the cost-of-
capital may be understated is the fact that many pharmaceutical firms carry 
significant cash balances.
(4) 
One of the authors undertook an informal survey of six pharmaceutical 
firms in mid-2001 with respect to the hurdle rates that drug firms utilize in their 
R&D investment decisions.  The survey of these firms yielded (nominal) hurdle      6
rates from 13.5% to over 20%.  If one takes 3% as the long-run expected rate of 
inflation, then an 11% real rate-of-return, corresponds to a nominal rate of 14%.  
This 14% rate is within the range of hurdle rates utilized by the drug firms in their 
R&D investment decisions, but it is at the lower end of the range.  This is 
consistent with the view that a CAPM analyses provides conservative estimates 
on the industry’s cost-of-capital.
(6)   
 
C.  R&D Investment Expenditures 
 
To obtain representative R&D investment expenditures for the new drug 
entities in our sample, we rely on the recently completed study by Di Masi et al.
[5]    
This study obtained R&D cost data for a randomly constructed sample of 68 
drugs that were first tested clinically between 1983 and 1994.  The DiMasi study 
is designed to measure the average cost of a new drug introduction and includes 
discovery costs as well as the costs associated with failed candidates. 
The mean introduction of our sample NCEs is 1992 while the mean 
introduction of drug candidates analyzed in the DiMasi study is 1997.  DiMasi 
and colleagues had previously undertaken an analysis of the costs of 1980s 
introductions using the same methodology employed in their new study.
[13]  That 
study was centered around 1984.  Given the availability of these two R&D cost 
studies centered around 1984 and 1997, we can utilize a linear extrapolation 
procedure to estimate the mean R&D costs for our sample cohort
 .
(7) 
Using this extrapolation procedure, we estimated the mean out-of-pocket 
R&D expenditures for the drugs in our sample to be $308.4 million.  This is 
approximately double the estimated R&D expenditures (in 2000 dollars) for the 
1980-84 samples of NCEs.  DiMasi also estimated a representative investment 
period of 12 years from initial drug synthesis to FDA approval.  We were able to 
allocate the out-of-pocket R&D costs over this 12 year period using weights 
derived from the DiMasi study.  Capitalizing these costs to the date of marketing, 
at a real cost-of-capital of 11%, yields $613 million as the average (pre-tax) 
capitalized R&D investment per '90-'94 NCE introduction.      7
Our analysis is performed on an after-tax basis.  For the time period under 
study, we estimate a 30% average effective tax rate for the pharmaceutical 
industry (see Section II-G).  Since R&D expenditures can be expensed for tax 
purposes, we multiplied the pre-tax values by 0.7 to get an after-tax value.  This 
is shown in the first row of Table 1.  Utilizing the 30% effective tax rate, 613 
million pre-tax capitalized corresponds to an after-tax value of $429 million. 
In addition to these pre-launch R&D expenditures, firms also undertake 
R&D outlays in the post approval period for product extensions such as new 
indications, formulations and dosage levels.  Since these activities can be viewed 
as spillovers from the original NCE introduction, these ongoing R&D investment 
expenditures, as well as any extra revenues that they generate, are appropriately 
incorporated into the analysis.  Based on the DiMasi et al study, we estimated 
the average post-approval R&D costs per NCE in our sample period to be $107 
million (before tax).
(8)  We allocated these costs equally over the first eight years 
of a NCEs market life, using a discount rate of 11% from the date of marketing.  
This yields a present value of $73 million (before-tax) and $51 million dollars 
(after-tax). 
Adding the after-tax values (Col. 2 of Table 1), the mean capitalized value 
for both pre and post approval R&D for the drugs in our sample is estimated to 
be $480 million.  This is the baseline value that we compare to the present value 
of net revenues for the mean NCE in our sample. 
 
D.  Global Sales  
 
In our prior analysis, we obtained U.S. sales data on each NCE in the 
sample.  We then estimated worldwide sales for these compounds using a 
worldwide sales multiplier that was common to all NCEs.  One limitation of this 
approach is that the ratio of worldwide sales to domestic sales varies 
significantly, both over time and across drugs in our sample. 
In the current analysis, our approach was to obtain worldwide sales data 
directly on as large a group of the drugs as possible.  We were generally      8
successful in this endeavor, in the sense that we were able to obtain worldwide 
sales data for a majority of the NCEs in our sample (66 NCEs) using several 
complementary data sources.  These 66 drugs accounted for over 90% of total 
U.S. sales realized by our sample of NCEs and presumably a similar, or even 
larger share, of their realized worldwide sales.  With respect to the latter point, 
there is evidence that the larger selling U.S. drugs diffuse across more countries 
and have larger sales globally than U.S. compounds with smaller domestic 
sales.
[14] 
To obtain worldwide sales data, we collected sales data that firms provide 
in their annual reports, in the reports of financial analysts, and in publications 
such as Med Ad News.  The latter source has compiled an annual survey of 
worldwide drug sales, by product, since 1990 on an expanding basis over time.  
The compilation for 2000 includes information on the top 500 selling prescription 
drugs worldwide.
[15] 
A complementary source of data that we also relied on is IMS data on 
worldwide sales, which is based on audit data sources from a large number of 
countries.  The IMS data source was available to us (from a prior project) for a 
sub-sample of drugs consisting of the very largest selling global drugs in our 
sample.  It provided a check on the sales information provided by the company 
sources.  In most cases, the IMS sales values were less than the company 
figures.  This reflected the fact that IMS does not capture all the sales channels 
available across countries, while the company data does include every channel. 
In about 25% of the overlapping observations, however, the IMS sales 
were greater than the company reported values.  An analysis into why this was 
the case revealed that the sub-sample of drugs with higher IMS sales was 
marketed internationally under multiple names and by several different 
companies.  Consequently, sources such as Med Ad News didn't capture all of 
the sales that were licensed to different companies for a particular molecule.  For 
the sub-sample of drugs for which this was an issue, we utilized the larger IMS 
worldwide sales values because they better captured the worldwide market.      9
Using this approach and these complementary data sources, we 
assembled worldwide sales data for 66 of the NCEs over the period of 1990 to 
2000.  We used a global multiplier approach for the remaining (very small selling) 
drugs in our sample. In particular, for these drugs, we multiplied their U.S. sales 
values times a representative global sales multiplier to obtain estimates of their 
worldwide sales.
(9)  As discussed, this latter sub-sample of drugs accounts for a 
very small share of overall sales for the full sample. 
 
E.  Life Cycle Sales Profiles 
 
Given that the data were available for the years 1990 to 2000, this 
provided seven to eleven years of worldwide sales values for the NCEs in our 
sample, depending on their date of introduction into the U.S. market.  The next 
task was to estimate future sales over the complete market life of these products.  
Twenty years was chosen as the expected market life.  This is the same 
assumption that we utilized for 1980s new drug introductions.  We believe this is 
a reasonable time horizon for an IRR analysis.  Any sales remaining after 20 
years of market life are likely to be very small, given the sales erosion 
experienced by most products from generic competition and product 
obsolescence.  Furthermore, these sales will also be severely discounted by the 
cost-of-capital in an IRR analysis. 
We utilized a two step procedure to project future sales values.  These 
steps involve forecasting sales to the point of U.S. patent expiry and then 
projecting sales in the post patent period.  The two-step approach is illustrated in 
Figure 1 for one of the products in our sample.  This product was introduced into 
the U.S. market in 1992.  There is nine years of sales information and its U.S. 
patent expiration occurs in year 12.  By year 9, this product was in the mature 
portion of its product life cycle.  Using a reference life cycle curve, the product is 
projected to have relatively stable sales (in constant dollar terms) until year 12.
(10)  
A significant decline is then projected in the period after U.S. patent expiration 
due to the entry of generic competitors and related economic factors.      10
The estimated sales decline after patent expiry is based on the experience 
of major commercial products coming off patent in the 1994-97 period.  In 
particular, we examined worldwide sales losses for a sample of NCEs for a four 
year period following their U.S. patent expiration.  The average percentage 
decline observed were 31%, 28%, 20% and 20% respectively.  We utilize these 
percentages to project sales in the first four years after patent expiration and 
thereafter, use a 20% percentage decline until the products market life is 
completed in year 20.
(11) 
We should note that the percentage declines in sales from generic 
competition in the U.S. market observed in prior studies are much greater than 
the worldwide losses in sales observed here.
[16]    Hence, the decline in 
worldwide sales in the post-patent period is ameliorated by the lower incidence of 
generic competition and sales losses outside the United States.  This may 
change by the time this cohort actually reaches patent expiration during the 
current decade, because reference pricing and generic competition are on the 
rise in many European countries.
[17] 
Figure 2 provides a plot of the sales life cycle profile (in 2000 dollars) for 
top two deciles as well as the mean and median drug compounds in our 1990-94 
sample. The sales curves illustrate the highly skewed distribution of sales in 
pharmaceuticals that was observed for early cohorts.  The peak sales of the top 
decile compounds are several times the peak sales of the second decile 
compounds.  The mean sales curve is also significantly above the median.   
Figure 3 provides a plot of mean worldwide sales for the 1990s sample 
compared to that for the 1980s cohort (expressed in 2000 dollars).  Mean sales 
have increased significantly in real terms, with peak sales increasing from $345 
mil for the 1980s cohort to $458 mil for the 1990s cohort.  There is also the 
suggestion that sales curves have become somewhat steeper in the ascending 
sales growth stages of the life cycle with a longer plateau before generic 
competition and product obsolescence takes hold. 
Figure 4 shows a corresponding plot of the sales for the top decile 
compounds in the 1990-94 to 1980-84 periods.  This is instructive given that the      11
prospective returns for top decile compounds are primary drivers of R&D 
investment activities in pharmaceuticals.  For the 1990s cohort, the top decile 
compounds reached peak sales of over $2.5 billion.  This may be compared to 
peak sales of near $1.8 billion for the 1980s cohort.  The peak sales also occur 
later in time compared to the 1980s cohort. 
 
F.  Pre-Tax Contributions and Other Economic Parameters 
 
The next step in the analysis is to obtain revenues net of production and 
distribution costs (often categorized in the economic literature as “quasi-rents”).  
For this purpose, we did an analysis of pre-tax contribution margins in 
pharmaceuticals during the 1990s.  As in prior work we utilize data derived from 
the income statements of the pharmaceutical divisions of a number of major 
multinational drugs firms to obtain representative values on contribution margins 
over time.
[1,2] 
Our analysis of the data on these firms indicated that average contribution 
margins gradually increased from 42% in the early part of the 1980s to 
approximately 45% at the end of the decade.  Based on these data, we 
constructed a linear contribution margin schedule over time. In particular, the 
contribution margin is 42% in the first year of the product life and grows by 
increments of 0.3% per year.  We also assume that contribution margins will 
continue to rise at this same rate during the current decade.  Hence, over the full 
20-year life cycle, target contribution margins are expected to rise from 42% in 
year one, to 48% by year 20, with a mean contribution margin of 45%, over the 
full life cycle. 
While we constrain margins to average 45% over the life cycle, we also 
recognize, as in our earlier analyses, that promotion and marketing expenditures 
are concentrated in the launch phases of the life cycle.  In our prior analysis, we 
developed an allocation rule based on a regression analysis of promotional and 
marketing outlays.  This rule was:  promotion and marketing is equal to sales in 
year one, declines to 50% in year two, and falls to 25% in year three.  We      12
retained this assumed pattern on marketing outlays in the present analysis.   
Interviews with industry participants indicated that the initial post-launch years 
continue to be the primary focus of marketing and promotion activities.  An 
analysis performed by Rosenthal et al. 
[18] further indicates that the drug 
industry’s marketing expenses to sales ratios have remained relatively stable in 
the 1996 to 2001 period.
(12)   
For the current analysis, we did make one relatively minor change in the 
allocation and timing of marketing expenditures related to launch.  In particular, 
we estimated that pre-marketing launch expenditures will occur on the order of 
5% and 10% of first year sales in the two years immediately prior to launch.  
These marketing expenditures are for activities such as pre-launch meetings and 
symposiums, pricing and focus group studies, and sales force training.  Our 
assumptions concerning the size and timing of these expenditures were guided 
by a recent survey report on pre-launch marketing expenditures done by industry 
consultants as well as interviews with some of the participating companies.
(13) 
As indicated above, our model is structured so that margins average 45% 
over the full product life cycle.  Given the assumed pattern of launch 
expenditures, contribution margins for each product are below representative 
industry values in the first three years of marketing.  However, as a product 
matures, both promotional and administrative costs decline in relative terms, and 
contribution margins increase over average industry values in the later years of 
the life cycle.   
The model is also structured to provide for capital expenditures on plant 
and equipment (P&E).  As in our model for the 1980s cohort, we assumed overall 
capital expenditures for P&E to be equal to 40% of tenth year sales.  Half of 
these outlays are assumed to occur in the first two years before marketing and 
the other half during the initial ten years of the product's market life.  These 
assumptions imply an average capital investment to sales ratio of  3.3% over the 
full product life cycle.  This is generally consistent with data from pharmaceutical 
industry income statements.
(14)      13
For working capital, it was assumed that accounts receivables are equal to 
two months of annual sales and inventories are five months of sales (valued at 
manufacturing cost).  These are also based on the analysis of balance sheet 
data of major pharmaceutical firms.  Working capital is recovered at the end of 
the final year of product life. 
 
G.  Effective Tax Rates 
 
Our analysis of returns is conducted on an after-tax basis.  In our prior 
studies of returns, we computed average effective tax rates based on analysis of 
income statement data from eight major pharmaceutical firms.  The average 
effective rate was 35% for the 1970s cohort and 33% for the 1980s cohort.  A 
comparable analysis for the 1990s cohort yielded  an effective tax rate of 30%.  
This is the rate that is used in our baseline case.  The difference between the 
nominal corporate tax rate (34%) and the average effective tax rate of 30% 
reflects various credits and deferrals such as the R&D tax credit and 
manufacturing tax credits for plants in Puerto Rico.
[2] 
After-tax cash flows are also influenced by the tax treatment of 
depreciation.  In our analysis, cash flow in each year is equal to after-tax profits, 
plus depreciation charges.  Accelerated depreciation, as specified in the U.S. tax 
code, results in tax deferrals and positive cash flow in the early years of a 
product’s market life.  This reverses in the latter years of a product’s life. 
 
 
H.  Summary of Economic Values 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the key economic inputs to IRR and NPV 
analysis for the 1990-94 NCEs cohort compared with the corresponding values 
for the 1980-84 cohort.  R&D investment levels have roughly doubled in real 
terms, in both uncapitalized as well as capitalized dollar terms.  On the revenue 
side of the equation, sales life curves have shifted upward significantly.  This is       14
reflected in higher peak sales for the 1990-94 cohorts ($458 million compared to 
$345 million for 1980-84 NCEs).  While sales have not grown at the same rate as 
R&D costs, contribution margins have increased in the 1990s implying higher 
operational profits from a given level of sales.  How all these factors balance out 
from a returns-on-investment standpoint is a major issue addressed in the 
analysis which follows.  The industry’s cost-of-capital, effective tax rate, and 
capital investment to sales ratio have changed only marginally for the current 
cohort compared to the 1980s sample. 
Table 2 suggests that R&D investment expenditures are growing over time 
relative to sales revenues and the other activities of pharmaceutical firms.  This 
issue is discussed further in Section IV.  This increase in industry research 
intensity can be interpreted both as a response to increasing profit opportunities 
from new drug research as well as an equilibrating factor bringing returns in line 
with the industry cost-of-capital.  This makes the question of industry returns on 
new drug introduction in the 1990s a particularly interesting question to analyze 
at the present time. 
 
III. Empirical  Results 
 
A.  The Baseline Case 
 
Using the data and assumptions described above, we constructed the 
pattern of cash flows for the mean of our sample of 118 NCEs shown in Figure 5.  
The R&D phase lasts for twelve years and results in a stream of negative cash 
flows.  The first years of marketing, years 1 and 2, are also characterized by 
negative cash flows.  This is because of heavy promotion and advertising 
expenditures during the product launch period.  Cash flows rise to a peak in year 
twelve and then begin to decline.  The decline becomes steeper as patent 
expiration and generic competition begin.      15
The baseline case results are shown in the first row of Table 3.  The IRR 
is 11.5% and can be compared to our real Cost-of-Capital (COC) estimate of 
11%.  Hence, the industry mean performance is positive but only by a small 
amount.  The present value of net revenues at the date of marketing is $525 
million and can be compared to the present value of R&D costs at the same point 
in time, or $480 million.  This leads to a Net Present Value (NPV) of $45 million. 
The results for the baseline case for the 1990-94 NCEs are roughly the 
same as for our earlier 1980-84 sample.  In the 1980-84 baseline case, the IRR 
was 11.1% compared to a COC of 10.5%.  The 1990-94 IRR is similarly about a 
half percentage point above the COC estimate. 
 
 
B. Sensitivity  Analysis 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding many of the key parameters that affect 
the IRR and NPV, we have performed a sensitivity analysis for a number of the 
parameters.  These results are reported in Table 3. 
An important parameter is the contribution margin.  As discussed earlier, 
we examined data for a number of firms during the 1990s and found that the 
average margin increased from 42% to 45%.  We then projected a continuing 
increase in the margin until year 20.  That is, we assumed that the margin 
increased from 42% to 48% by year 20, yielding an average of 45%.  Hence, for 
the sensitivity analysis, we calculated the IRR and NPV for average margins of 
40% and 50%--in both cases the upward trend of the base case was maintained.  
For example, for the lower margin case we assumed that the margin increased 
from 37% to 43% by year 20. 
The IRR varied significantly from 10.6% to 12.4% as the average margin 
varied from 40% to 50%.  Similarly the NPV ranged from a negative $32 million 
to $120 million.  It should be noted that for the first ten years or so of product life 
the margin is based on real data—it is the last ten years that is more uncertain      16
and difficult to predict.  Hence, the range of change in outcomes in perhaps 
overstated. 
The next parameter that we examine in Table 3 is the tax rate.  The base 
case is 30% and we calculate the effect of tax rates of 25% and 35%.  Clearly, 
changing the tax rate results in quite small changes in the IRR and NPV.  At 25% 
the IRR is 11.6% and at 35% it is 11.4%-- compared to the base IRR of 11.5%.  
This relative insensitivity of the IRR to the tax rate reflects the fact that this rate 
affects the R&D cost and revenue sides of the equation in a parallel fashion. 
The effect of generic competition in eroding pioneer brand sales after 
patent expiration has tended to become greater over time.  In the U.S., generic 
market shares in terms of pills sold increased from 35% one year after generic 
entry in the period immediately following the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act to 64% in 
the mid 1990s.
[6]  Europe is also experiencing a rising trend in generic 
competition.
[17]   As a result, it is difficult to predict the degree of sales loss in the 
future.  To examine this problem, we assumed two alternative scenarios:  that the 
sales losses of the pioneers after patent expiration were 25% and 50% greater 
than what was assumed in the base case.  Figure 6 shows these alternative 
sales erosion patterns. 
Given that the effect of these sales losses occurs in the later stages of the 
product life cycle, the effect is made smaller when measured in present value 
terms.  The IRR falls modestly from 11.5% in the base case to 11.4% and 11.3% 
in the 25% and 50% greater erosion cases respectively.  Similarly, the NPV falls 
from $45 million in the base case to $33 million and $20 million. 
Varying the COC results in significant changes in the NPVs.  A 10% COC 
would result in a NPV of $131 million, considerably larger than the base case 
using the 11% COC of $45 million.  A 12% COC, on the other hand, leads to a 
negative NPV of $37 million.  These changes are comparable in magnitude to 
those observed for changes in the contribution margin. 
The final sensitivity analysis in Table 3 is the effect of reducing regulatory 
review time by one year.  This involves a change in the average regulatory 
review time from 18 months to 6 months.  Our approach is to simply shorten the      17
R&D period by one year and compute the lower capitalized value of R&D at the 
date of marketing.  This reduces R&D from $480.3 million to $437.7 million; 
hence, the base NPV rises from $45 million to $87.5 million.  The IRR increases 




C.  Distribution of Returns 
 
In figure 7, we show the decile distribution of present values of returns for 
the 1990-94 samples of NCEs.  These returns are gross of R&D costs.  The 
deciles are constructed based upon the ranking of the 118 NCEs in terms of their 
individual present values of returns.  The average sales of the top decile of NCEs 
are then used to calculate the present value of returns for the top decile, and so 
forth. 
The figure shows that the distribution is highly skewed.  For example, the 
top decile has an estimated present value of $2.7 billion.  This is almost six times 
the present value of average R&D costs ($480 million).  The top decile alone 
accounts for about 52% of the total present value generated by all ten deciles.  
This compares to the value of 46% that we found in our 1980-84 study. 
It is also true that the second and third deciles have present values that 
exceed average R&D costs, or $1 billion and $0.6 billion respectively.  However, 
the fourth decile’s present value is only $433 million in comparison to average 
R&D costs of $480 million.  A detailed analysis of the present value for the 
individual NCEs shows that 34% or about one-third of the NCEs have present 
values in excess of the average R&D cost.  By the time one gets to the median 
drug, present values are significantly below R&D costs. 
A further illustration of the importance of top-ranked NCEs to industry 
returns can be demonstrated by removing the very top-ranked drug from the 
analysis.  That is, we will eliminate Zocor, thereby reducing the sample from 118 
to 117, and re-calculate the mean present value of returns.  The result is that the 
present value falls from $525 million to $479 million, and the NPV falls from $45      18
million to a negative $1 million.  Hence, if it were not for this one “blockbuster” 
drug, the average NCE of the 1990-94 cohort would essentially just break even in 
terms of an NPV analysis. 
We should observe that the fact that the majority of the drugs in our 
sample have present values substantially below the fully allocated R&D cost 
does not mean that these drugs are not economically important.  Since the 
average R&D cost includes an allocation for drugs that drop out during the 
development process, an “unprofitable” drug that more than covers variable costs 
going forward contributes positively to the firm’s bottom line.  Many of the 
uncertainties that exist for a new product (i.e., its clinical profile in terms of risks 
and benefits, the introduction of substitute products, the size of market demand, 
etc.), are usually not resolved until late in the R&D process.  At this point, most of 
the R&D costs are sunk.  Therefore, it is still worth getting the incremental 
revenues of these smaller selling drugs, if they can cover their expected variable 
costs going forward.  Over the long run, however, a firm must have it share of 
products in the top few deciles to have a viable R&D program. 
Figure 8 provides a comparison of the distribution of returns for all four 
sample cohorts that we have examined to date:  1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84 and 
1990-94.  The vertical axis in this graph shows the percentage of overall returns 
that each decile accounts for in its sample cohort.  The drug industry has 
exhibited a high degree of skewness over all 4 sample cohorts spanning this 25 
year period.  In this regard, the top decile has accounted for between 46% and 
54% of the overall returns over the 4 sample cohort that we have analyzed.   
Scherer and colleagues have shown that a high degree of skewness is typical of 
several different populations of technological innovations, including the outcomes 
of venture backed startups, university licensed patents and venture backed 
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IV.  Drug Innovation and Industry Evolution Since 1970 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, this is the third study that we have 
performed of the industry returns on R&D.  The three studies employ the same 
general methodology.  Consequently, they provide a convenient window to view 
the industry’s development over the critical period from 1970 through the 1990s. 
 
 
A.  Trends in Industry Returns and R&D Expenditures 
 
In Table 4, we provide a summary of the mean internal return observed for 
our sample beginning with the 1970-74 cohort and ending with the 1990-94 
period.  The first column in Table 1 shows that the IRR has increased steadily 
from 7% for the 1970-74 sample to 11.5% for 1990-94 introductions.  The biggest 
incremental change occurred during the second half of the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s.  Over this time period, the mean return increased from 7.0% to 
9.7% and then to 11% respectively. 
It is instructive to compare the mean estimated industry return in each 
period to the corresponding cost-of-capital (COC) for the pharmaceutical industry 
over that same period.  For the 1970-74 cohort, the mean industry return of 7.0% 
was significantly less than the industry’s cost-of-capital of 9%.  This relationship 
reversed in the second half of the 1970s (with a 9.7% IRR versus a 9% COC). 
While the industry cost-of-capital increased in the 1980s and 1990s, so has 
mean returns.  Returns have remained modestly above the cost-of-capital for 
these cohorts. 
It is also useful to examine the trends in industry R&D expenditures during 
these periods.  Figure 9 shows the aggregate R&D-to-sales ratios for seven 
major drug firms that have reported R&D consistently over the complete period 
1962 to 1994.
[21]  This figure shows that the R&D-to-sales ratios for these firms 
declined in the period 1962 to 1974, stabilized in the second half of the 1970s,      20
and then began a steep increase from 1980 to 1994.  The R&D-to-sales ratios for 
these firms grow from 7% in 1980 to 13% in 1994. 
Mike Scherer has recently examined long term trends in industry R&D 
expenditures and profit margins for the period 1962 to 1996.
[2]  He finds a 0.96 
rank correlation in the deviations from trends in this industry’s expenditures and 
profit margins over this 35 year period.  His results also indicate that R&D 
expenditures and profit margins in the pharmaceutical industry generally grow 
out a slower rate relative to the long run trend until the late 1970s, when they 
began a steep upward track. 
These findings suggest that a beneficial competitive cycle may be at work 
in the pharmaceutical industry.  In particular, R&D investment has not only led to 
innovation and profits in the form of the highly skewed distribution of returns 
observed here, but profits, or the expectation of profits, has produced expanding 
R&D investment.  In this latter regard, Grabowski and Vernon also find that 
industry profit expectations on R&D, as well as internal cash flows, are highly 
significant explanatory variables of R&D investment outlays.
[21]  T h i s  t y p e  o f  
competitive feedback cycle can be viewed as socially beneficial given the 
extensive literature on the high social returns from pharmaceutical R&D. 
[22] [23]   
Scherer has characterized the strong relationship between industry R&D 
investment and profitability, in conjunction with the fact that mean industry 
returns are only modestly above the industry cost-of-capital, as evidence of a 
“virtuous rent seeking model.”  If this is a correct interpretation of the industry’s 
competitive behavior, the data on long term trends suggests that the late 1970s 
represented a key turning point in terms of both industry returns and the growth 
in R&D expenditures.  This issue is explored further in the next section. 
 
 
B.  The Pattern of Drug Innovation Since 1970 
 
A number of pharmaceutical industry studies found diminishing returns to 
R&D characterized the 1960s and 1970s compared to the earlier post-War      21
period.
[24, 25]  The earlier period had witnessed a wave of important drug 
introductions. This involved many new antibiotic drugs, hydrocortisone and 
several other cortocoids, the thiazide diuretic and beta blocker drugs for 
hypertension, new classes of tranquilizers and anti-depressants, and the initial 
birth control drugs.  However, by the early 1970s, the industry was experiencing 
diminishing returns in many of the drug classes that had seen major advances in 
the 1950s and 1960s.  A number of hypotheses were investigated, including the 
effects of more stringent FDA regulations, diminishing technological opportunities 
and increased product liability.  Some scholars saw the industry entering a 
prolonged period of technological maturity.
[26] 
Finding new drugs that were advances over established drugs had clearly 
become increasingly costly and more problematic by the early 1970s.  Many of 
the leading firms began to focus their R&D activities on new therapeutic targets 
and approaches.  One important concept that took root during this period was the 
“rational drug-design” approach to R&D.  This involved the use of x-ray 
crystallography and other techniques to design specific compounds that could 
block particular receptor sites and thereby create desired therapeutic responses.  
The primary approach to discovering new drug therapies prior to this time 
involved the random screening of compounds against a small number of known 
targets.   
An important milestone for the industry occurred in 1978 with the 
introduction of Tagamet (cimetidine) by SmithKline.  This drug was not only a 
significant advance in the treatment of ulcers, but also provided validation of the 
“rational drug design” approach to R&D.  Tagamet was the first of the histamine 
H2  receptor inhibitors.  It was specifically designed to block H2  histamine 
receptors which were known to affect the process of acid secretion.  Within a few 
years, it had become the largest selling drug worldwide.  This drug by itself had a 
disproportionate effect on the returns for the full portfolio of 1970s new drug 
introductions.  Indeed, when this one drug was removed from the portfolio of 
1970-79 drugs, the average present value for the remaining compounds declined 
by 14%.
[2]  Tagamet was eventually replaced by another H2 blocker, Zantac, as      22
the largest selling drug worldwide.  Zantac became the top selling drug in our 
1980-84 cohort of NCEs.
[1] 
  The two and one-half decades that have elapsed since the introduction of 
Tagamet in 1978 have witnessed an impressive renaissance in drug innovation 
that is reflected in the trends toward higher returns and R&D intensities over this 
period.  Table 5 provides a list of several important new chemical classes of 
drugs that were first introduced between 1978 and 1994.  These classes all 
represent a new approach or mode of action to treating particular diseases or 
indications.  The pioneering drugs in these classes are concentrated in the very 
top deciles of the sample cohorts for which we have analyzed returns.  Many of 
these drugs have been the subject of specific cost benefit and pharmcoeconomic 
studies. 
  Table 5 also provides information on the various indications and disease 
categories to which these new drug classes are targeted.  There are many 
diseases listed which previously had few or inadequate drug treatments (i.e., 
herpes, AIDS, ovarian cancer, migraine, schizophrenia, etc.).  The list also 
includes several novel biotech drugs like Erythropoletin (used to treat anemia for 
patients undergoing treatment for kidney dialysis, AIDS and cancer) and the 
alpha and beta interferons used in the treatment of cancer and multiple sclerosis.  
Several of the new classes of drugs listed in Table 5 provide medical and 
economic benefits in the form of better patient tolerability and side effect profiles 
in the treatment of widespread medical problems (i.e., hypertension, cholesterol 
reduction, depression, etc.). 
Looking forward, the drug industry is currently confronted with a new wave 
of technological opportunities.  The mapping of the genome, and related 
advances in fields like bioinformatics, has led to an abundance of potential new 
targets for disease intervention.  These advances could have profound effects on 
the discovery process itself, the size of clinical trials and the nature of demand for 
pharmaceutical products.
[27]  However, it remains unclear how fast these new 
technologies will result in important new drug therapies and how they will impact 
industry returns.  In this regard, a recent report by McKinsey and Lehman      23
Brothers foresees a negative impact on returns until at least the latter part of this 
decade, when the substantial required buildup in R&D investments begin to bear 
fruit.
[28]  If this is so, the industry could be facing another crossroads in the 
immediate future as the transition to new R&D paradigms compounds already 
existing economic pressures from the health care sector, financial markets, and 
government officials. 
 
V. Summary  and  Conclusions 
 
  Consistent with our prior studies, a primary finding of the current analysis 
is that the distribution of returns for 1990-94 new drug introductions is highly 
skewed.  In this regard, only one-third of the new drug introductions had present 
values in excess of average R&D costs.  The top decile of compounds by itself 
accounted for over 50% of the present value of post-launch returns generated by 
the full sample of introductions. 
From an industry prospective, the estimated mean return for the 118 new 
drug introductions in the 1990-94 period was 11.5%.  This compares to a real 
cost-of-capital of 11% for this sample cohort.  At this cost-of-capital, the mean 
introduction earned an NPV of $45 million dollars (2000 dollars).  A sensitivity 
analysis showed that returns are robust to changes in the economic parameters 
and assumptions.  Changes in contribution margins and R&D times had the most 
impact on returns. 
  The principal results are, therefore, similar in nature to our study of 1980-
84 new drug introductions – namely R&D in pharmaceuticals is characterized by 
a highly skewed distribution of returns and a mean industry IRR modestly in 
excess of the cost-of-capital.  However, a look at the pattern of change on the 
inputs into our analysis shows a number of dynamic forces at work in this 
industry.  In particular, R&D investments per new drug introduction approximately 
doubled compared to the 1980-84 period.  At the same time, the number of new 
introductions, the average sales per introduction and industry contribution 
margins increased significantly in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.      24
Our studies of industry returns provide support for what has been labeled 
as a “virtuous rent seeking model” of R&D competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Since the end of the 1970s, the industry has experienced rapid growth 
in R&D outlays and the introduction of many important new therapeutic classes 
and blockbuster compounds.  At the same time, mean industry returns on R&D 
over this period have only modestly exceeded the industry’s cost-of-capital.   
Whether this beneficial cycle of increasing R&D intensities and innovative new 
product introductions will continue into the future remains to be seen.  There are 
currently a number of promising new developments in the pharmaceutical R&D 
process, but the benefits from these technologies have an uncertain time horizon 
and they will likely require substantial increases in industry R&D investments.   
How quickly these evolving new technologies will lead to important new 
medicines will depend not only on scientific and economic factors, but also on the 
course of public policy actions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1.  We are using a broad definition of NCE here.  Our sample includes “large-
molecule” biologics, in addition to traditional “small molecule” chemical 
drugs. 
 
2.  Three drugs were omitted from our sample because they failed to appear 
in any year in the IMS sales data audits.  These three drugs involved an 
antiprotozal agent for sleeping sickness, an agent for opiate dependence, 
and one for nephropathic cystinosis, a rare inherited disorder affecting 
functioning of the liver.  These products are apparently distributed outside 
of normal sales channels.  In addition, given their special indications and 
characteristics, they are also likely to have non-representative R&D costs. 
 
3.  Another related fact is the passage of the Orphan Drug Act by Congress in 
1983.  This provided economic incentives, especially 7 years of market 
exclusivity, for the development of drugs targeted to indications involving 
less than 200,000 patients (or for which the manufacturer could 
demonstrate that development would be unprofitable).  As we have 
discussed elsewhere, there is a  high degree of overlap between the 
biopharmaceutical and orphan drug sub-samples.
[8]  This reflects the fact 
that many of the initial recombinant biotech drugs had indications for small 
patient populations and, in addition, biopharmaceutical firms sought out 
the market exclusivity protection of the Orphan Drug Act, given the 
uncertainties surrounding many biopharmaceutical patents.
 
 
4.  Myers and Shyum-Sunder found that many pharmaceutical firms have 
large positive cash balances and are actually net lenders rather than net 
borrowers.  Consequently, these firms have a negative debt ratio.  Myers 
and Shyum-Sunder do a sensitivity analysis to gauge how this factor      26
would affect their 1990 value and they find it causes the nominal (and real 
cost-of-capital) to increase by almost a full percentage point.
[9] 
 
5  Several surveys have been performed of the hurdle rates used by U.S. 
companies.  A general finding is that hurdle rates are typically greater than 
the weighted cost-of-capital computed by a CAPM analysis.  For example, 
Poterba and Summers received responses from 228 companies, of the 
Fortune 1000, and found an average hurdle rate of 12.2% in real terms in 
the early 1990s.
[12] They also found that hurdle rates can vary substantially 
across a company’s functional areas and specific projects.  The average 
difference between the highest and lowest hurdle rate within companies 
was 11.2%. 
 
6.  Myers and Howe further indicate that the R&D decision process can be 
modeled as a compound option pricing model.
[11]  Under this model, at any 
point in the R&D decision-making process, future R&D serves as a form of 
leverage, or debt, assuming the firm decides to undertake further 
development and marketing.  Since this “debt” or leverage declines over 
the subsequent stages of the R&D process, so will the firm’s cost-of-
capital.  Implementation of this model requires unobservable informational 
inputs compared to the standard CAPM approach using a weighted cost-
of-capital.  DiMasi et al, perform a sensitivity analysis using this option 
value approach, and show that for reasonable values of the forward 
looking discount rates, the CAPM and option value models yield 
comparable results. 
 
7.  Since our sample is centered around 1992, we utilize the following linear 
extrapolation equation to derive R&D costs:  
R&D92 = R&D84 + (8/13) R&D97  
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8.  DiMasi et al. obtained data from all the firms participating in his survey on 
pre-approval and post-approval R&D expenditures.  Based on an analysis 
of these data, they estimated that out-of-pocket R&D expenditures for 
product extensions in the post-approval period were 34.8% of pre-
approval R&D expenditures.  Applying this percentage to our estimate of 
$308.4 million for pre-approval R&D yields an estimate of $107 million (in 
2000 dollars) as the R&D cost for post-launch product improvements. 
 
9.  For these purposes, we utilized a global sales multiplier of 2.19 that was 
derived from actual worldwide sales and U.S. sales for the other drugs in 
our sample.  This multiplier may overstate worldwide sales for drugs to 
which it is applied since, as noted, these drugs may well not have diffused 
globally as extensively as the drugs for which we had worldwide sales 
data. 
 
10.  The reference life cycle curve is based on observed sales for drug 
products introduced into the market in the immediately prior period.  We 
used this as the basic template for most of the NCEs.  However, we also 
make adjustments to these values using the sales projections of security 
analysts to allow for changing market conditions and competitive 
developments in particular therapeutic classes. 
 
11.  In our prior work on generic competition, we found that generic 
competition is focused on products with significant sales at the time of 
U.S. patent expiration.  Consequently, for the drugs concentrated in the 
bottom four decile of our sample (with worldwide sales of less than 40 
million dollars in year 10 of their market life), we assume that the 
probability of generic competition is very low.  For these drugs we assume 
sales losses in the mature phase of cycle will proceed at a more 
moderately declining rate based on the reference curve used for the pre-
patent expiration period.      28
 
12.  Although the aggregate marketing to sales ratio in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry was stable around 14% between 1996 and 2000, 
there were some important compositional shifts over this period.  Direct-
to-consumer advertising to sales ratio increased from 1.2% to 2.2% 
between 1996 and 2000, at the expense of physician detailing and 
hospital medical journal advertising.  The growth in direct-to-consumer 
advertising was stimulated, in part, by a change in the FDA regulations 
involving television ads for prescription drugs in 1997.
[18] 
 
13.  Best Practices LLC, a Chapel Hill, NC management consulting firm, 
conducted interviews with and obtained data from 11 pharmaceutical firms 
on global marketing launch expenditures in 1998.  In particular, they 
focused on 12 market launches in depth and obtained detailed marketing 
data relating to these launches.  We talked with several of the participants 
in this study to get further perspective on how these budgeted 
expenditures generally related to first year sales.  We used this 
information to develop the representative percentages used in the model. 
 
14.  In particular, we checked the reasonableness of our assumptions by 
comparing this implied 3.3% capital investment to sales ratio to the 
corresponding ratios observed on industry income statements during the 
1990s.  We found that the drug industry capital investment to sales ratio 
averaged about 7.0% during the 1990s.  However, the latter value 
includes investment for R&D as well as production, marketing and 
administrative facilities.  In our model, provisions for capital investment in 
R&D facilities are included in the cost estimates provided by DiMasi.   
Accordingly, we asked some industry members involved with strategic 
planning for information on what percentage of their plant and capital 
equipment expenditures were devoted to R&D, versus other firm activities.  
We obtained a range of 40 to 50% of total capital expenditures devoted to      29
R&D.  Given this range, the capital investments to sales ratio for non-R&D 
activities implied by our model is consistent with the observed data from 
company income statements. 
 
15.  This sensitivity analysis captures only the direct effects of shorter FDA 
review times on the capitalized value of R&D costs.  We abstract from any 
potential benefits associated with a longer effective patent life.  As we have 
explained elsewhere, under the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, most drugs are 
eligible for compensatory increases in effective patent life equal to any lost 
time in regulatory review.  Consequently, it is only for a smaller subset of 
drugs where the patent restoration time is constrained where shorter 
regulatory review times would increase effective patent life (for example, 
because there is a maximum of five years on the patent life restored under 
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Capitalized R&D Costs for 




R&D Costs (mils 2000$)  Pre-Tax  After-Tax 
    
Discovery and Development 
 
          $613        $429 
Product Extensions After Launch                73               51    
           
  Total 
 










1.  R&D costs include expenditures on product failures as well as successes. 
 
 












Key Economic Values for IRR Analysis 




Average R&D Costs:   1990-94 1980-84 
   Pre-Tax Uncapitalized  $416 mil  $196 mil 
   After-tax Capitalized  $480 mil  $251 mil 
Peak Sales for Mean NCE  $458 mil  $345 mil 
Contribution Margin  45%  40% 
Cost-of-Capital 11%  10.5% 
Effective Tax Rate  30%  33% 





A.  R&D costs and sales values are all expressed in 2000 dollars. 
 
B.  Average contribution margins over the full product life cycle; launch costs 
are concentrated in early phases of life cycle, so margins are lower in initial 
















Case  Present Value  Present Value NPV  IRR 
  Cash Flows  R&D Costs     
 (after-tax)  (after-tax)     
Baseline 525.2  480.3  45.0  11.5 
at 40% margin  449.8  480.3  (30.5)  10.6 
at 50% margin  600.7  480.3  120.4  12.4 
        
at 0.25 tax rate  571.3  514.6  56.7  11.6 
at 0.35 tax rate  479.2  446.0  33.2  11.4 
        
at 25% greater sales 
decline after patent life 
512.9 480.3  32.7  11.4 
        
at 50% greater sales 
decline after patent life 
500.7 480.3  20.4  11.3 
        
at 10% cost-of-capital  586.8  455.7  131.1  -- 
        
at 12% cost-of-capital  470.0  506.7  (36.8)  -- 
        
at 1-year reduction in    
regulatory review time 
525.2 437.7  87.5  12.2 
        
 














Mean Industry Returns and Cost-of-Capital for 






NCE Cohort Mean  IRR Cost-of-Capital 
   
1970-74 7.0%  9.0% 
   
1975-79 9.7%  9.0% 
   
1980-84 11.1%  10.5% 
   














Important New Drug Classes 
1978 – 94 
 
 
Year Class  Early  Entrants  Indication 
1978 H2 receptor antagonists  Tagamet, Zantac  Ulcers 
1981  ACE inhibitors  Capoten, Vasotec  Hypertension 
1982  Calcium Channel Blockers  Procardia, Calan  Hypertension 
1982  Nucleosides  Zovirax, Famvir  Herpes Virus 
1983 Interleukin-2  inhibitors  Sandimmune  Transplantation 
1985  Human Growth Hormones  Protropin, Humatrope  HGH Deficiency 
1986 Quinolones  Noroxin,  Cipro  Antibiotic 
1986  Interferon Alphas  Intron A, Roferon A  Cancer 
1987 Statins  Mevacor,  Pravachol  Cholesterol  Reduction 
1987  Nucleoside/RT inhibitors  Retrovir, Videx  AIDS 
1988  Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors  Prozac, Zoloft  Depression 
1989  Proton pump inhibitors  Prilosec, Prevacid  Ulcers 
1990 Erythropoietin  Epogen,  Procrit  Anemia 
1990  Macrolides (semi-synthetic)  Biaxin, Zitromax  Antibiotic 
1990 Bis-Triazoles  Diflucan  Antifungal 
1991 5-HT3 antagonists  Zofran, Kytril  Antiemetic 
1992  Granulocyte (G-CSFs)  Neupogen  Cancer Adjunct 
1993  Taxoids  Taxol, Taxoterre  Ovarian Cancer 
1993  Interferon-betas  Betaseron, Avonex  Multiple Sclerosis 
1993 5-HT1 antagonists  Imitrex, Zomig  Migrane 











Figure 1  Actual and projected sales values for a representative sample product. 
 
Figure 2  Worldwide sales profiles of 1990-94 new drug introductions. 
 
Figure 3  Comparison of sales curves for the mean drug in 1990-94 and 1980-84 
samples. 
 
Figure 4  Comparison of sales curves for top decile drugs in 1990-94 and 1980-84 
samples. 
 
Figure 5  Cash flows over the product life cycle:  baseline case. 
 
Figure 6  Alternative assumptions regarding sales erosion in the post-patent period. 
 
Figure 7  Present values by decile for 1994 new drug introductions. 
 
Figure 8  Present values by deciles for four samples of new drug introductions. 
 
Figure 9  Aggregate R&D to Sales Ratios 1962-1994. 